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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 757 
Accident time: 10:35 Accident Date: 07/06/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/0308/01635, 
MF1847, Qala-e-




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: hard 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
use of shovel (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-02 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Central to investigate the de-mining accident 
involving [the Victim] the Section Leader of [Demining group] DT-02. The accident occurred at 
1035 hours on 07 June 2009 at minefield number AF/0308/01635/MF1847, located in Qala-e-
Ahmad Khan village, Bagram district of Parwan province.                                                                                           
SUMMARY: 
MF # AF/0308/01635/MF1847 is an anti-personnel mine contaminated task around Bagram 
Airbase. During Russian invasion on Afghanistan a security belt of landmine was established 
by the government forces to secure the airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. MF 1847 is 
heavily contaminated minefield covered 57,335 sqm area, [Demining group] DT-02 cleared 
12,986 sqm area and found/destroyed 370 AP mines till the accident date.   
On 07 June 1035 hours [the Victim] the section leader of mentioned team stopped his 
deminer [Name removed] and started to work instead of him as the deminer was getting tired. 
He hit the top of a mine with his prodding tool so the accident occurred. There is a wound with 
regular edges on the forehead of section leader and some abrasions on his face and left eye. 
The PPE was used during the operation, but the visor was broken down by a forceful back out 
of excavation tool possibly the shovel and caused the injury to him.  According to the 
investigation report, the pictures of wound, the view of scene and the picture of broken visor, 
it seems that the shovel was used during operation. As the ground was hard and required to 
be prepared by MDU first, but it was not planned and ignored by team command group. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
It was the fault of team leader for giving permission to section leader to work instead of a 
deminer. The section leader himself made a big mistake in terms of giving up his own job as a 
controller and getting involved in detection and investigation of signals. The poor 
management of the operations in the task was another factor contributed to the accident.    
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
[Demining group] management is recommended to strengthen the internal QA and strictly 
control the teams in terms of team/operations management and site operations planning. 
[Demining group] is also recommended to make sure that the job description is will 
understood by command group. And to ensure that the safest way of conducting demining 
operations is being practiced. In order to prevent such cases in future, the [Demining group] 
Operations department is requested to come up with a management solution to such cases 
and present it to MACCA OPS department by no later than 2nd July 2009.   
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 946 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Eye; minor Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . wound with regular edges on the 
forehead. .  and some abrasions on his face and left eye " 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the Victim and his Team Leader had made a “mistake” when the 
Victim took over excavation from a tired deminer. The secondary cause is listed as 
Inadequate equipment because excavation in hard ground with a shovel is patently 
dangerous. The fact that the ground should have been mechanically prepared was noted by 
the investigators, and the fact that it was not was a Management Control Inadequacy which 
they noted as a cause.  
In the absence of photographs, it is uncertain whether the Victim was wearing his visor. It 
seems that the blade of the shovel was thrown back at the Victim and it may have hit the 
Visor, breaking it’s face, or hit his face causing a “wound with regular edges” (which a broken 
visor is unlikely to do). 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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